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Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) play more and more
important role in many critical practical applications,
such as battle field monitoring, healthy data acquisi-
tion, and many others. In WSN-based applications,
data collected and stored by sensors are usually valu-
able and sensitive, which should be protected against
unauthorized access from malicious attackers. An ideal
solution for providing both secrecy and authentication
is to apply the well-known cryptographic primitive—
authenticated key exchange (AKE). The ‘‘form’’ of an
AKE protocol here is closely related to the system
model of the deployed WSNs.
System model
We here consider a system model (shown in Figure 1) for
heterogeneous ad hoc WSNs which involve three types
of principles, that is, users (U), sensors (S), and a gate-
way node (GWN). In this system, a user may hold a
smart card, who wants to access or configure a sensor
(on-site) in terms of actual field conditions. The user’s
smart card is used as a security tool to authenticate the
user via both memorable password and its stored long-
term symmetric authentication key. Meanwhile, an AKE
protocol is typically executed among user’s smart card,
sensor, and GWN to establish a secure channel between
user and sensor. Since the smart card and sensor do not
share an authentication key, the online authentication is
carried out by the remote GWN which shares symmetric
authentication keys with users and sensors, respectively.
Related work
A sensor node is typically limited in power, storage,
and computation resources. This has led to the
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development of so-called ‘‘lightweight’’ multi-factor
user authentication schemes and AKE protocols for
WSNs.1–15 However, these AKE schemes have various
protocol structures determined by underlying wireless
sensor networks. For example, the protocols proposed
in previous studies10,12–17 are specifically designed for
Internet of things (IoT), wherein the GWN stands in
the middle of the user and the sensor to take charge of
the communication between them. We refer the reader
to the work by Ferrag et al.18 for more recently pro-
posed lightweight AKE schemes. In this article, we pri-
marily concern about the AKE schemes1,2,6,7,9–11 under
the system model shown in Figure 1. Note that building
a secure AKE protocol for WSNs is non-trivial, since
more than two participants and multiple authentication
factors might be involved. Any subtle errors may lead
to a broken protocol. Specifically, several previous
schemes are found1,5,7,9,11 to be vulnerable to certain
practical active attacks.
Chang and Le9 recently showed that a previous pro-
tocol proposed by Turkanovic et al.7 is vulnerable to
stolen smart card attack, impersonation attack with
node capture, sensor node spoofing attack, stolen veri-
fier attack, and backward secrecy attack. As an
improvement of Turkanovic et al.’s scheme, two light-
weight AKE protocols (i.e. called P1 and P2) were
introduced by Chang and Le9 (which will be referred to
as CL scheme), which can provide both authentication
and data privacy for the communication between user
and sensor. The CL scheme can be considered as a
trade-off between security and performance; that is, the
CL scheme aims to satisfy the most desirable security
attributes but provides high performance with low
computation and communication cost (which are
important for WSNs). In particular, only one authenti-
cation key is required to be stored at GWN. This dra-
matically improves the storage performance of GWN.
Besides the efficiency, one of the advantages of the CL
scheme is its provable security. The security of the CL
scheme was proven in a model (which will be referred
to as CL model) that is derived from the AKE model
by Bellare et al.19 A protocol with security proof is rea-
sonably necessary to formally show that its targeting
security goals and properties (specified by the corre-
sponding security model) are satisfied.
However, a security proof itself needs time to be fur-
ther validated and discussed by researchers to avoid
errors that were somehow overlooked. In 2016, Das
et al.11 instigated the weaknesses of CL protocols, that
is, the CL protocols cannot resist with smart card lost/
stolen attacks and session-specific temporary informa-
tion attacks. The password update phase of the CL pro-
tocols was also criticized by Das et al. by lacking of
local password verification during the authentication
phase. In order to enhance the security of the CL proto-
cols, an efficient three-factor AKE for WSNs is pre-
sented to eliminate the weaknesses of the CL protocols.
Our results
In this work, we further revisit the security results of
the CL scheme. We first notice that some key elements
(e.g. the freshness and security experiment) in the CL
security model are not well-formulated at all. This may
lead to an awkward situation that no protocols can be
proven secure in the CL model. We hereby clarify the
ambiguities and fix up the loopholes in the CL model
by showing a revised version. Furthermore, we notice
that some recently proposed multi-factor AKE proto-
cols11,14 are claimed to satisfy probably security. But
similar problems can be also found in the models
defined in these literature. Hence, our improved model
can serve as a guidance to show how to formulate secu-
rity definitions for three-party multi-factor AKE proto-
cols. Researchers can simply derive new appropriate
security models from ours to formally re-analyze the
state-of-the-art ‘‘provable secure’’ AKE protocols11,14
for WSNs.
In particular, we figure out that the CL scheme can-
not provide session key security as claimed by the
authors since it is unable to resist with sensor capture
attack, namely, the security result of Chang and Le9
Theorem 2 is incorrect. We show that the attackers can
make use of a corrupted sensor to impersonate arbi-
trary uncorrupted users to uncompromised sensors as
it wishes. We notice that such corruption of a sensor is
allowed in the security analysis of P2.9 It is not hard to
see that such attack is very harmful in real-world appli-
cations. For example, if an attacker plants a malicious
sensor, then it can intercept all communications among
uncorrupted principles. In order to fix this problem, we
give a simple and effective improvement with minimum
modifications to P2. The improved scheme is also
shown as an example to achieve the provable security
with random oracles in our revised security model.
Figure 1. System model.
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows.
Section ‘‘Security model’’ discusses the problems of the
CL model and introduces our revised security model.
Subsequently, in section ‘‘On the security of the CL
protocol,’’ we introduce an attack against the CL
scheme and our improvement. Section ‘‘Performance
comparison’’ shows our experimental and comparison
results. Finally, section ‘‘Conclusion’’ concludes this
article.
Security model
The CL model9 is defined very vaguely and informally.
Based on the CL model, it cannot be used to analyze
the security and the corresponding proof of the CL
protocol. In the sequel, we first give some remarks on
relevant important notions which are defined inappro-
priately in the CL model. Second, we re-define the
security definitions to obtain an improved security
model. The notations used in the rest of the article are
first recalled in Table 1.
Remarks on the CL security model
We hereby mainly discuss the problems of the CL
model from the following two perspectives: (1) fresh-
ness and (2) security experiment. Note that all these ele-
ments are fundamental to a security model, which are
unfortunately not well addressed by the CL model. We
review the freshness defined in the CL model:
Freshness. The instance PuUi or P
t
Sj
is fresh if their ses-
sion key SK has not been revealed to the adversary A.9
The problems of such freshness definition are sum-
marized as follows:
 In the CL model, there is no RevealKey query
(as in the work by Bellare et al.19) which allows
the adversary to obtain the session key of a ses-
sion. Hence, there is no way for an adversary to
reveal the session key in the CL security
experiment.
 CorruptSC and CorruptS queries are defined
without any restrictions on this freshness defini-
tion. This implies that an adversary A can trivi-
ally ask a CorruptSC(PlUi ) query to obtain the
long-term secret key of Ui, even for the target
session. Then A is able to run some protocol
instance with PtSj on behalf of Ui and select P
t
Sj
as the test session in the security experiment. In
this situation, A can always win using her own
ephemeral secret key and the long-term secret
key of Ui.
According to the above discussions, we, first, have
the conclusion that no protocol can be secure in the CL
model.
Second, the security experiment is not clearly
defined. There is no formulation on the timing of ora-
cle queries which are performed in the security experi-
ment. For example, whether an adversary can keep
asking oracle queries after the Test query. This would
also affect the security definition. Note that the adver-
sary is allowed to ask many Test queries in the CL
model. However, the guess bit b0 returned by an adver-
sary is not associated with a specific Test query so that
we cannot correctly evaluate the advantage of an
adversary.
Improved security model
We here define a security model which is suitable for
proving the CL protocol. This model follows from
indistinguishability-based AKE security models.19–22 In
the following, let ‘, r, d 2 N be positive integers. In the
execution environment, we fix a set of ‘ honest users
and r sensors at all. We may use a general ID in the
following to denote one of these kinds of identity in
fID, SID, IDGWNg.
We assume that each honest party can only sequen-
tially execute the protocol. This restriction is used to
prevent replay attacks. This is characterized by a collec-
tion of oracles fPsIDi : i 2 ½‘, s 2 ½dg for users, oraclesfPtSIDj : j 2 ½r, t 2 ½dg for sensors, and oraclesfPzIDGWN : z 2 ½(r+ ‘)dg for GWN. Each oracle PsID
behaves as party ID carrying out a process to execute
the sth protocol instance with some partner (which is
Table 1. Notations.
Ui User
GWN Gateway node
Sj Sensor node
IDi Identity of a party
SIDj Identity of a sensor
IDGWN Identity of GWN
ID General identity which might denote an
Identity in fID, SID, IDGWNg
pwi Password of Ui
SCi Smart card of Ui
XGWN Long-term secret of GWN
Ti Timestamp
DT Expected transmission delay
ri, Ki Random numbers
P Point on an elliptic curve
P  x x-axis value of the point P
jj,  , h() Concatenation, XOR, and hash operation
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determined during the protocol execution). All oracles
of ID have access to the authentication credential–
related information stored on the devices (e.g. the
smart card of a user and GWN). For time Ti and pre-
specified time interval DT , only one protocol instance
can be executed within time period ½Ti, Ti+DT .
Moreover, we assume each oracle PsID maintains a
list of independent internal state variables including (1)
FsID—execution state F
s
ID 2 faccept, rejectg, (2)
pidsID—identity of the intended communication part-
ner, (3) TsID—timestamp at when the oracle is executed,
(4) KsID—session key, and (5) TM
s
ID—the protocol mes-
sages orderly sent and received by PsID. Furthermore,
we will always assume (for simplicity) that KsID=[ if
an oracle has not reached accept state (yet).
Adversarial model. An active adversary A in this model
is formalized as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
Turing Machine. The active attack powers of an adver-
sary are formulated by allowing it to ask the following
queries:
 Execute(IDi, s, SIDj, t, IDGWN , u): If PsIDi , PtSIDj ,
and PuIDGWN have not yet been used, this oracle
executes the protocol between these instances
and gives the transcript of this execution to the
adversary. This oracle query models passive
eavesdropping of a protocol execution.
 Send(IDi, s,m): The adversary can use this
query to send any message m of his own choice
to the oracle PsIDi . The oracle will respond with
the next message m (if any) to be sent according
to the protocol specification and its internal
states. Oracle PsIDi would be initiated via send-
ing the oracle the first message m=(T, IDj)
consisting of a special initialization symbol T
and the identity IDj of the intended partner.
After answering a Send query, the oracle vari-
ables will be updated depending on the specific
protocol.
 RevealKey(IDi, s): Oracle PsIDi responds with
the contents of the variable KsIDi if and only if
the oracle PsIDi has reached an internal state
FsIDi =accept and IDi 6¼ IDGWN . CorruptSC(IDi): This query returns information
stored on the smart card of the user IDi.
 CorruptS(SIDj): This query returns information
stored on the sensor SIDj.
 Test(IDi, s): If oracle PsIDi has state
FsIDi 6¼ accept or KsIDi=[ or IDi= IDGWN ,
then the oracle returns some failure symbol ?.
Otherwise, it flips a random bit b, samples a ran-
dom key K0 !$ Kake, and sets K1=KsIDi ,
where Kake is a session key space. Finally, the
key Kb is returned. The oracle P
s
IDi selected by
adversary in this query is called as test oracle.
Secure AKE protocols. During the protocol execution,
two oracles may interact with each other to exchange
messages for key establishment. We here define a
notion concerning partnership following Bellare and
Rogaway22 which is specifically introduced for three-
party AKE. Note that the patterning notion in Chang
and Le9 is defined in a similar way (but quite informal).
Let pf : IDi, s, pidsIDi , TsIDi , TMsIDi ! (IDj, t) be a
partner function22 which is a map on given execution
states of PsIDi points to its partner oracle P
t
IDj , whereIDj 2 pidsIDi and t 2 ½d. The output of partner func-
tion should be uniquely determined by TMsIDi of each
oracle. In terms of the CL protocol, we realize pf by
returning (IDj, t) if and only if all of the following con-
ditions are held:
 Both PsIDi and PtIDj accept.
 IDj 2 pidsIDi and IDi 2 pidtIDj ;
 0 jTsIDi  TtIDj j DT ;
 TMsIDi 	 TMtIDj or TMtIDj 	 TMsIDi .
 PtIDj is the unique oracle (which meets the above
conditions).
Correctness. We say an AKE protocol P is correct if
two accepted oracles PsIDi and P
t
IDj are partner, then
both oracles hold the same session key.
In order to define the security, we define two notions
on oracle freshness that describe the active attacks
allowed in the following security experiment. Let PsIDi
be an accepted oracle with intended partner IDj, where
(IDi, IDj) 6¼ IDGWN . And let PtIDj be an oracle (if it
exists), such that PsIDi is a partner oracle of P
t
IDj , that
is, pf (IDi, s, pidsIDi , TsIDi , TMsIDi)! (IDj, t).
Definition 1. Oracle Freshness with Forward Secrecy
(OFFS)—the oracle PsIDi is said to be OFFS fresh if
none of the following conditions holds:
1. A queried RevealKey(IDi, s);
2. If PtIDj exists, A queried RevealKey(IDj, t);
3. If IDi is user, A queried either CorruptSC(IDi)
or CorruptS(SIDj) prior to the acceptance of
PsIDi ;
4. If IDi is sensor, A queried either
CorruptS(SIDi) or CorruptSC(IDj) prior to the
acceptance of PsIDi .
Definition 2. Oracle Freshness without Forward Secrecy
(OFwoFS)—the oracle PsIDi is said to be OFwoFS-
fresh if none of the following conditions holds:
1. A queried RevealKey(IDi, s);
2. If PtIDj exists, A queried RevealKey(IDj, t);
3. If IDi is user, A queried either CorruptSC(IDi)
or CorruptS(SIDj);
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4. If IDi is sensor, A queried either
CorruptS(SIDi) or CorruptSC(IDj).
We let OF= fOFFS,OFwoFSg.
Security experiment EXPakeP,A(l,OF ). On input security
parameter 1l, the security experiment is proceeded as a
game between a challenger C and an adversary A based
on AKE protocol P, where the following steps are
performed:
1. At the beginning of the game, the challenger C
implements the collection of oracles fPsIDi :
i 2 ½‘, s 2 ½dg for users and fPtSIDj : j 2 ½r,
t2 ½dg for sensors, and fPzIDGWN : z2 ½(r+‘)dg
for GWN. All long-term pre-shared key for
users, sensors, and GWN are generated, respec-
tively. C gives the adversary A all identities as
input.
2. A may issue a polynomial number of queries
regarding Execute, Send, CorruptSC, CorruptS,
and RevealKey.
3. At some point, A may issue Test(IDi, s) queries
during the experiment. After the Test query, A
can keep asking other queries as it wishes.
4. At the end of the game, A may terminate and
output a bit (b0, IDi, s) as its guess for b of
Test(IDi, s) query. Then the experiment would
return a failure symbol ? if one of the following
conditions is held: (1) A has not issued any Test
query, or (2) the Test(IDi, s) query returns a
failure symbol ?, or (3) the test oracle is not
OFfresh.
5. Finally, the experiment returns 1 if b= b0;
Otherwise, 0 is returned.
Formally, an instance PsIDi represents an online
attack if both following conditions hold at the time of
the Test query: (1) at some point, the adversary queried
Send(IDi, s,m) and IDi is not corrupted and (2) at
some point, the adversary queried RevealKey(IDi, s)
or Test(IDi, s). The number of online attacks repre-
sents a bound on the number of passwords the adver-
sary could have tested in an online fashion. Let D be
the maximum bit length of a user’s password. The max-
imum number of online attacks that A can perform to
the owner of the test oracle is bound by d.
Definition 3. Session Key Security—Given a correct
AKE protocol P and an adversary A which runs the
above security experiment without failure, we then
define the advantage of A as follows
AdvakeP,A(l,OF ) :¼ Pr½EXPakeP,A(l,OF )= 1 
1
2








We say that a correct AKE protocol P is session-
key-secure if for all adversaries A the advantage such
that AdvakeP,A(l,OF ) d‘=D+ negl(l) where negl(l) is
a negligible function in the security parameter l.
On the security of the CL protocol
A sensor capture attack against the CL protocol
CL Protocol. We first briefly review the P2 protocol.9 The
user registration phase is shown in Figure 2. The proto-
col execution of P2 is depicted in Figure 3.
A sensor capture attack against P2. We here describe a sen-
sor capture attack against the session key security of
P2.9 The protocol P1 has the same problem.9 In this
attack, we will make use of some compromised sensor
to impersonate an arbitrary honest user. Note that the
corruption of sensor is allowed in Theorem 2.9 In real-
world applications, such compromised sensor might be
also registered by an attacker as well. The core attack
idea is to extract the secret Yi= h(fijjT1) which is used
to compute the authentication message Hj. However, Yi
is only computed involving an honest user Ui’s secret fi
and timestamp T1. This implies that the Yi can be re-
used many times in different sessions (to impersonate
Ui to any uncompromised sensors) during T1+DT .
The concrete attack steps performed by an adversary
A are described as follows:
 A corrupts some sensor say SIDj to obtain its
long-term secret fj, that is, via CorruptS(SIDj).
The goal of A, for instance, is to impersonate
some honest user Ui to communicate with
another uncompromised sensor Sv.
 A asks Ui to run a protocol instance PsIDi with
sensor SIDj, that is, via sending P
s
IDi
the first mes-
sage as Send(IDi, s, (T, SIDj)). A intercepts the
message m1= fMIi, Zi,Ni, T1g.
 A gets timestamp T2 and honestly computes
Aj :¼ h(fjjjNijjT2) which is computable via com-
promised fj.
 A sends m2= fMIi,Ni, SIDj,Aj, T1, T2g to GWN
and receives m3= fFij,Hi,Ei, T3g.
Figure 2. Registration phase of Chang and Le.9
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 A computes Yi :¼ Fij  h(fjjjT3). At this point,
we stress that the A is able to impersonate Ui to
SIDv at time T1. We next show that the attack is
possible if the time consumption of the above
execution is less than DT . This is very like to hap-
pen, for example, DT = 1 min.
 A selects a random a and Ki = aP and com-
putes Zi :¼ Ki  Yi and Ni :¼ h(YijjMIijjSIDv).
The message m1= fMIi, Zi ,N i , T1g is sent to
some oracle of sensor SIDj, say P
l
SIDv
.
 Meanwhile fj :¼ h(SIDjjjXGWN ) would run the
protocol with GWN honestly. PlSIDv replies A
with message m4= fRiv,Ei , T4 g where
Riv= h(K

i jjT4) Kv and Kv = bP is chosen by
PlSIDv . Finally, A could compute Kv :¼ h(Ki jjT4) Riv
and session key K :¼ h(abP  x), where
abP  x is the x-coordinate of the point abP.
Note that Ki is chosen by A of its own
choice.
Note that based on such corrupted sensor, A is able
to launch (unlimited) the above attack to impersonate
any honest users Ui to any uncompromised sensors Sv
at an arbitrary time T1 chosen by A. This would enable
us to break the session key security of P2. It is not hard
to see that this attack is also very harmful in practice.
We highlight that the similar attack can be also
mounted to P1.
Since the attack mainly exploits the corrupted sensor
to obtain the secret Yi which can be extracted from the
ciphertext Fij based on the corrupted secret key fj.
Therefore, the attack time roughly equals to the mes-
sage delivery time of m1 and m2 and computation time
of two hash operations (for computing Aj and Yi). If
the attacker fails within a time T1+DT , it can just
choose another time T10 to start the attack again.
An improved protocol
In order to fix the problem of P2 (cf. P1), the computa-
tion of Yi should be modified. Specifically, we suggest
adding the sensor’s identity SIDj into the generation of
Yi, that is, Yi= h(fijjMIijjSIDj). We also include the mes-
sages exchanged between user and sensor into the ses-
sion key generation so that the resultant session key is
uniquely bound to a specific session. The rest of proto-
col execution of P2 remains the same. The improved
protocol is shown in Figure 4 with minimum modifica-
tions. The improved protocol preserves all the proper-
ties of the original protocol such as session key security
and perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
Figure 3. P2 of Chang and Le.9
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The improved protocol consists of four phases which
are described as follows:
1. User registration phase. The user registration
phase is shown in Figure 2.
 The user Ui selects an identity IDi and a
password pwi and generates a random
nonce ri. Ui computes MPi :¼ h(rijjpwi)
and sends the registration message
mUreg = fIDi,MPig to the GWN over some
secure channel.
 Upon receiving mUreg, GWN verifies the
user’s identity and generates a random
nonce ri. Then, GWN computes a pseudo-
nym MIi :¼ h(ri0 jjIDi) for Ui and uses its
long-term key XGWN to compute
fi :¼ h(MIijjxGWN ) and ei :¼ MPi  fi.
Finally, GWN creates a smart card
SCi= fMIi, eig and issues it to the user Ui
over some secure channel.
 After receiving the smart card SCi, Ui
writes the value ri into it. Eventually, the
smart card SCi stores fMIi, ei, rig.
2. Sensor registration phase. The sensor registra-
tion phase should be also run over some secure
channel. As for a sensor node Sj, GWN first
selects a unique identity SIDj. Then, GWN com-
putes fj :¼ h(SIDjjjXGWN ). Meanwhile, the tuple
(SIDj, fj) is stored by GWN. Finally, the identity
SIDj and the authentication key fj are written
into the sensor node Sj.
3. Authentication and key exchange phase. The fol-
lowing protocol steps are performed:
1. Message 1 (m1): Ui to Sj
 Ui inputs its identity IDi and pass-
word pwi.
 Upon receiving fIDi, pwig, the smart
card SCi computes MPi :¼ h(rijjpwi)
and the corresponding authentication
key fi :¼ ei MPi.
 SCi gets the current timestamp T1
and selects a random value a2RZp.
Next, SCi computes an ephemeral
public key Ki :¼ aP, a ciphertext
Zi :¼ Ki  Yi and an authentication
message Ni :¼ h(YijjMIijjSIDj).
 The message m1= fMIi, Zi,Ni, Tig is
sent to the sensor Sj.
2. Message 2 (m2): Sj to GWN
 Upon receiving m1, Sj checks whether
or not T1 is a valid timestamp.
Figure 4. The improved P2.
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 Sj gets a timestamp T2 and computes
an authentication message Aj :¼
h(fjjjNijjT2).
 The message m2= fMIi,Ni, SIDj,
Aj, T1, T2g is sent to GWN.
3. Message 3 (m3): GWN to Sj
 Upon receiving m2, GWN aborts if
either T1 or T2 is not valid.
 GWN computes verification mes-
sages fj0 = h(SIDjjjXGWN ) and Aj0 :¼
h(fj0 jjNijjT2), fi0 :¼ h(MIijjXGWN ), and
Ni0 :¼ h(Yi0 jjMIijjSIDj). GWN rejects
if Ni0 6¼ Ni and Aj0 6¼ Aj.
 Next, GWN gets a timestamp T3 and
computes an authentication key
Yi0 :¼ h(fi0 jjT1jjSIDj) and a ciphertext
Fij :¼ Yi0  h(fj0 jjT3), and authentica-
tion messages Hj :¼ h(Yi0 ) and
Ei :¼ h(fi0 jjNi0).
 The message m3= fFij,Hi,Ei, T3g is
sent to the sensor Sj.
4. Message 4 (m4): Sj to Ui
 Upon receiving m3, Sj checks T3, and
computes the verification key
Yi0 :¼ Fij  h(fjjjT3). Sj rejects if
Hj 6¼ h(Yi0).
 Sj selects a random value b2RZp and
computes an ephemeral public key
Kj :¼ bP. Next, Sj gets a timestamp
T4 and computes a ciphertext
Rij :¼ h(KijjT4) Kj.
 The session key is computed as
K :¼h(abPxjjKijjKjjjMIijjSIDjjjT1jjT4),
where abPx is the x-coordinate of
the point abP. The input of the hash
function covers almost all protocol
messages exchanged between user
and sensor, so that the session key is
uniquely bound to a session identi-
fied by such transcript.
 The message m4= fRij,Ei, T4g is sent
to the user Ui.
5. Finalize: User Ui.
 Upon receiving message m4, Ui
checks the timestamp T4 and com-
putes the verification message
Ei0 :¼ h(fijjNi) and rejects if Ei0 6¼ Ei.
 Ui computes the session key
K :¼h(abPxjjKijjKjjjMIijjSIDjjjT1jjT4).
4. User authentication key change phase. Suppose
the user has been authenticated in an AKE
session with his or her old password pwi, SCi
has MPi in that session. Then the user Ui
inputs his new password pwnewi . After this,
SCi computes MP
new
i :¼ h(rijjpwnewi ) and
enewi :¼ ei MPi MPnewi . Finally, SCi stores
enewi .
The decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. Let G be a
group of prime order p under an elliptic curve. Let P be
a random generator of G. The decisional Diffie–
Hellman (DDH) problem is stated as follows: given
tuple (P, aP, bP, cP) for a, b, c !$ Zp as input, it is hard
to distinguish whether c= ab.
Definition 4. For a group G of prime order p and an
adversary D, we define the following experiment:
EXPddh
G, p,D(l)
P $ G; (a, b, g) $ Zp; b 
$ f0, 1g;
if b= 1 then G abP, otherwise G gP;
b0  D(G, p,P, aP, bP,G); if b=b0 then return 1,
otherwise return 0.
The advantage of D in above experiment is defined
as follows
Advddh
G, p,D(l) :¼ Pr½EXPddhG, p,D(l)= 1 
1
2








We say that the DDH problem relative to a group G
of prime order p holds, if for all PPT adversaries D the
advantage Advddh
G, p,D(l) is a negligible function in l.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the hash function h is mod-
eled as random oracle, the output bit length of the hash
function is n, and the DDH problem relative to a group
G with prime order p holds, then the fixed protocol P20
is session-key-secure such that AdvakeP20,A(l,OFFS) d=
D+ qh=2
n3+(d‘)2  Advddh
G, p,D(l), where qh is the num-
ber of allowed random oracle query.
Due to this modification, each credential Yi is partic-
ularly bound to an execution between the user IDi and
the sensor SIDj at time T1. Thus, the attacker is unable
to abuse Yi involving some malicious sensor SIDv to
impersonate IDi to some honest sensor SIDj.
Proof. The proof is proceeded following the game-based
approach.23 Let Advj denote the advantage of A in
Game j.
Game 0. The first game is the real security experi-
ment which is run between an adversary A and an AKE
challenger C. Thus, we have that
AdvakeP,A(l)=Adv0
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Meanwhile, C will simulate the queries of A as
follows:
 Execute(IDi, s, SIDj, t, IDGWN , u) and Send(IDi,
s,m) queries will be honestly simulated as defined
in section ‘‘Security model’’ following our proto-
col specification.
 RevealKey(IDi, s): The session key returned by
this query is SK= h(abP:xjjKijjKjjjMIijjSIDj
jjT1jjT4).
 CorruptSC(IDi): This query returns SCi=
fMIi, ei, rig of IDi.
 CorruptS(SIDj): This query returns the contents
of fj= h(SIDjjjXGWN ) of SIDj.
 Test(IDi, s): This query will be honestly simu-
lated as defined in section ‘‘Security model.’’
However, the test oracle (asked by this query)
should keep fresh throughout the security experi-
ment in the sense of Definition 1.
In this game, the challenger just simulates these
queries following the protocol specification without any
modification. In the subsequent games, we may change
them step by step till the advantage of the adversary is
zero.
Game 1. In this game, the challenger aborts if the
adversary A asks the random oracle h() with a user Uis
password pwi and its randomness ri as input, that is,
MIi= h(rijjpwi). This implies that the adversary can ask
a Send(IDi, s,m) query, such that pwi 2 m. Recall that
pwi is used to compute MPi which is used to decrypt
fi=MIi  ei. In this case, the adversary must be able to
succeed in online attacks.
The length of the password is assumed to be D.
Hence, if the adversary can input the correct pwi, then
it is able to impersonate the user (e.g. after obtaining
the victim’s smart card without compromising the
secret information stored in the smart card). The prob-
ability that A correctly guesses is about 1=D. Note that
A can try d‘ times which is the maximum number of
Send query to all ‘ parties. The winning probability of
a successful online attack is bound to d‘=D. Thus, we
have that
Adv0Adv1+ d‘
D
Game 2. In this game, the challenger first aborts if a
fresh oracle of GWN receives a valid Ni which is not
sent by any fresh oracle of Ui at a valid time. To gener-
ate a valid Ni, the adversary A has to either (1) break
the one-wayness of the hash function or (2) randomly
guess (correctly) the output of the random oracle h()
for generating Ni. If the case (1) holds, the adversary A
may be able to ask the random oracle h(YijjMIijjSIDj)
and h(fi) with the correct fi but without asking the cor-
responding CorruptSC query. The abort event implies
that the adversary is able to either find the pre-image
of the hash value (after obtaining the protocol tran-
script via Execute query) or forge the protocol message.
Since each Ni is used only once, either fi or h(fijjT1) is
protected by the one-wayness of the hash function h.
Hence, the probability of correctly generating a valid
Ni for A is bound to 1=2n1. Furthermore, we add
another similar abort rule that the challenger aborts if
an oracle of GWN receives a valid Aj which is not sent
by any fresh oracle of Sj. The security of Aj is quite sim-
ilar to that of Ni.
Since there are two such authentication messages, Ni
and Aj, each of which has two related hash operations,
A can ask at most qh random oracle queries. We there-
fore have that
Adv1Adv2+ qh
2n2
Game 3. In this game, the challenger aborts if one of
the following conditions holds: (1) a fresh oracle of Sj
receives a valid Hi which is not sent by any fresh oracle
of GWN or (2) a fresh oracle of Ui receives a valid Ei
which is not sent by any fresh oracle of GWN . With the
similar arguments in the previous game, we have that
Adv2Adv3+ qh
2n2
As a result in this game, we have the fact that the test
oracle must have a partner oracle; otherwise, the chal-
lenger has aborted.
Game 4. In this game, we try to reduce the security
to the DDH hard problem. We change the session key
of the test oracle to be a random value. If there exists
an adversary which can distinguish this game from the
previous game, then we can make use of it build an
algorithm D to solve the DDH problem. Given a DDH
challenge instance (xP, yP, cP), the job of D is to distin-
guish c= ?xy. Meanwhile, D first guesses the test oracle
and its partner oracle. If its guess is incorrect then it
aborts. The abort probability is bound to 1=(d‘)2. In
the following, we assume that D’s guess is correct.
Then D sets the ephemeral DH key of the test oracle to
xP and its partner oracle’s DH key as yP. The session
key of the test oracle is computed as h(cPjjxPjjyPjjMIi
jjSIDjjjT1jjT4). The other simulations are similar to the
previous games. So that if c= ab, then the game is
identical to the previous game. Otherwise, it is equiva-
lent to this game. Due to the hardness of the DDH
problem, we have that
Adv3Adv4+AdvddhG, p,D(l)
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As the bit in the Test query is not used anymore, the
advantage of an adversary in this game is zero, that is,
Adv4= 0. To sum up all probabilities in the above
games, we get the result of this theorem.
Performance comparison
In this section, we compare our improved scheme with
related existing similar lightweight AKE protocols of
Shi and Gong4 (SG), Choi et al.6 (CLK+), Turkanovic
et al.7 (TBH), and Das et al.11 (DKO+) which are run
under the same system model.
We approximately test the performance of compared
protocols on PC with Intel Core i7, 4.2 GHz+8GB
RAM, and Python 2.7. Let tmul and th denote the esti-
mated experimental time of 224-bits elliptic curve point
multiplication and a SHA256 hash function operation
(for 128 bytes message), respectively. We omit the cost
of XOR in the comparison, which is much smaller than
the other two types of operations. We specifically have
that tmul= 3:8ms and th= 0:007ms. We consider a bio-
metric computation required by Das et al.’s scheme as
a hash operation. The comparison of computational
cost is listed in Table 2.
In Figure 5, we compare the communication cost of
our scheme with existing schemes. We make reasonable
assumptions that each identity is 128 bits, each random
nonce is 256 bits, each timestamp is 64 bits, each elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) group value is 224 bits, and
each hash value is 256 bits.
Turkanovic et al.’s7 scheme (TBH) is more efficient
than all other listed protocols but it does not provide
PFS. Our improved scheme inherits the high perfor-
mance of P2,9 which provides a trade-off between secu-
rity and performance. Although the computation cost
of our scheme is slightly more expensive than that of
Shi et al.’s scheme (SG), our scheme is the most efficient
one for the user and GWN among those compared pro-
tocols which satisfy PFS. Furthermore, our scheme has
the best communication performance.
Conclusion
In this article, we revisited a recently proposed AKE
scheme9 for WSNs. We have shown that there is a secu-
rity vulnerability in this scheme. We also demonstrated
a concrete attack and gave a solution for avoiding this
attack. Some improvements for the security model have
been given for analyzing the improved protocol. Since
a good AKE protocol might need to provide as many
security properties as possible, it might be interesting
(as a future work) to further improve our protocol and
Das et al.’s11 scheme by incorporating more security
attributes as introduced in recent literature.12,24 Of
course, one could also strengthen our security model to
cover more active attacks for specific protocols.
Among those security properties, PFS has been a de
facto standard property of AKE. Recently proposed
lightweight AKE protocols,4,6,9,12,25 all achieve PFS
based on Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHKE). Since
two exponential operations are required in DHKE, it is
not efficient for either smart card or sensor due to its
low processing resources. Another open problem is to
construct lightweight AKE protocols which provide
PFS without relying on Diffie–Hellman–like primitives.
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